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IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BRANDTJEN & KLUGE, INC._
a corporation of the State of Minnesota.
Plaintiff & Appellant
vs.

No. 8112

C. JEAN SHONKA & ANNA E. ERICKSON
dba Acme Multigraph Co.,
Brigham City. Utah.
Defendants & Respondents

RESPONDENTS'

BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 17th day of September, 1951 the defendants
herein made a payment of $50.00 (Ex. D-11) to the plaintiff
upon a purchase order contract for one 12 x 18 Kluge Platen
Press dated October 18, 1951. This contract provided that
the Seller would furnish a competent man to install the
equipment and his expense while so doing would be borne
by the Seller.
Thereafter at an unknown date, but prior to November
27, 1951, plaintiff through its agent one G. H. Ra~ymond
(Ex. D-6) induced defendants to execute an instrument
purported to be a release of the plaintiff company's obligation to furnish a competent man to im;tall the equipment,
upon the reprcRcntation of the said Agent, G. II. Raymond,
1
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that he would install and give training on the machine. Defendants advised plaintiff by this same purported release,
of their complete lack of experience with or knowledge
about the press or its function. That thereafter on November 27, 1951 a conditional sales contract for the purchase
and sale of this equipment was entered into by the parties
and defendants paid an additional $385.35 to plaintiff. On
December 6, 1951 part of the equipment weighing approximately 3,000 pounds was delivered to the defendants' place
of business at Brigham City and there left in the crates until April 5th or 6th, 1952.
About the middle of December, 1951, the plaintiff's
agent, G. H. Raymond, telephoned defendants from Salt
Lake and advised that he would install the machine then or
during the 2nd week of .January (Ex. D-13) but which he
did not do. The installment due on the contract was made
on December 27, 1952 by the defendants. The machine remained uncrated in the middle of defendants' floor and on
February 22nd defendants wrote plaintiff's agent, Raymond, and also mailed a copy of said letter directly to the
plaintiff's home office (Ex. D-13), objecting to the failure
to have the machine installed and the difficulty in having
to make payments while the machine remained idle. Nothing at all was done by plaintiff or its agents to place tht
machine in operating condition, and on March 29th, after
other correspondence, defendants caused a letter to be written to plaintiff (Ex. P-13) advising plaintiff that if immediate arrangements for the installation were made and
training given defendants would bring their payments up
to date.
On April 5th plaintiff's agent, G. H. Raymond, uncrated
and assembled the machine and pushed it into position in
the shop of the defendants, The machine was not levelled
2
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nor bolted to the floor as would be necessary to complete an
installation. (R- 220,222). Raymond then advised the defendants that the rollers were not there but that he would
have them sent in in a week or so and that he would come
over and complete the installation and give instruction (R.
153, 159, 161). The rollers, however, were never sent or
the installation completed nor was there any offer or tender of delivery or completion Hearing nothing further
from plaintiff or its agents for 16 days defendants on
April 22nd advised plaintiff of their recision of the contract
and tendered back the machinery upon return of defendants' money paid on said machine (Ex. D-8).
Thereafter, without offering to complete performance
under said contract, the plaintiff commenced this action
under the said contract of November 27, 1951 (R-1).
Upon these facts the Court properly gave judgment in
favor of the defendants for the restoration of the moneys
expended by them in completing their part of the contract
up to the time of the recision.
ARGUlVIENT
Respondents' argument will be directed in sequence to
plaintiff's statement of points upon which it relies for the
reversal of the judgment.
As to Point No. 1, appellant cites the general rule that
a party is not entitled to both recision and restoration of his
advancements and damages for a breach of contract, and
with which authority Respondents have no argument.
However, upon the precise point involved, that of whether
or not moneys necessarily expended in performance of a
contract by one party should be properly restored where a
recision has taken place, Appellant offered no authority.
Under this contract or contracts, if the Court has construed
3
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all of the documents as constituting a contract between the
parties, Respondents were obligated to keep this particular equipment at their address at 11 West Forest Street at
Brigham City, Utah, and to there keep the property insured
at least to the amount owing to the plaintiff and appellent.
To comply with the contract then, Respondents necessarily
had to have the property shipped to Brigham City and
hence the freight could and should be considered an item
of necessary expense to Respondents in performing their
end of the contract. As Appellant points out in 12 Am. Jur.
1038 the effect of a recision is to- "Put the parties back
in the same position they were in prior to the making of
a contract.--", and the courts use the language "return to
status quo". In the case of Edwards vs Miller 228 Pac.
1105, an Oklahoma case, there is ~ontained a discussion of
the question of what is necessary in order to return the
parties to status quo, and in that case, a reverse situation
from the instant case, it was said in order to return a contracting party to the status quo only the money actually
paid out in good faith in putting the contract into affect,
wiuld necessarily have to be restored. It would seem,
therefore, that the Court could properly take the view that
the $157.28 expended for freight was a necessary and
proper item of expense in carrying into effect the contract
by the Respondents. And clearly there is no authority to
the contrary furnished by the Appellant, and none was discovered by this writer in checking this point.
As to Point No 2 Appellant takes the somewhat inconsistant view that the original contract, promissory note,
and conditional sales contract should be contrued together
but that Appellant's obligation is controlled exclusively by
the first or purchase order contract and cannot be enlarged
by any subsequent contracts. Respondents did not at the
4
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trial have and do not now have any objections to the application of the rule of law requiring all the written documents
to be construed togehter in determining the ultimate contract of the parties. But this rule of law cited by Appellant would. certainly include as one of the written documents forming part of the same transaction and executed in
connection with the transaction the entire Exhibit D-6.
Appellant itself of course relies upon Ex. P-2 and so it
would necessarily have to form a part of the controct. And
as will be covered more fully under Point No. 3, if Ex. P-2
does form a part of the contract then certainly the written
representations of the Appellant through its agent should
and was held. to be admissable by the Court.
Appellant's argument seems to be that because the six
rollers were specifically excluded from the list of standard
equipment on the purchase order contract that they were
not bound to furnish rollers. However, the contract speaks
for itself and on the purchase order agreement is the following language "Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., due to varying
climatic conditions, does not guarantee the supply of rollers
to meet local requirements, and the rollers supplied are furnished free of charge for the convenience of the erector in
completing the installation". So that while the contract
excludes rollers from the standard equipment the contract
just as surely makes them a part of the equipment that will
be furnished, but upon which no guarantee of suitability
to climate is made. But certainly the purchase order contract contemplated the furnishing of rollers and the subsequent or November 27th contract merely put that into
words when it used the language "with 6 rollers and all
standard equipment." (Ex. P-3).
Under its same Point No. 2 Appellant contends that
tht rule in the State of Utah that in cases of doubt or am5
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biguity the contract will be construed more strongly against
the writer thereof, is not followed and cites Caine vs. Hagen·
berth, but the Hagenberth case uses the language which we
contend for, that if there is an ambiguity then of course it
will be construed most strongly against the user of the language in determining the meaning, and by the very language which Appellant uses, the rule will be applied to avoid
a forfeiture, and by its action Appellant seel<:s to work a
forfeiture of all previous payments made upon this contract
by the Respondents herein. So that by the rule that Counsel
cites in order to avoid a forfeiture the Court may well apply
the rule of construction most strongly against the writer
of the contract. 12 Am. J ur. P. 795 sets the rule out as
follows:
"Doubtful language in contracts should be interpreted
most strongly against the parties who use it. A written agreement should in case of doubt be interpreted
against the party who has drawn it. Sometimes the
rule is stated to be that where doubt exists as to the
interpretation of an instrument prepared by one party
upon the faith of which the other has incurred an obligation, that interpretation will be adopted which will
be favorable to the latter. It is said that an instrument uncertain as to its terms is to be most strongly
contrued against the party thereto who causes such an
uncertainty to exist. - - - - "
In our case, of course, the plaintiff, Brandtjen & Kluge
prepared all contracts entered into by the parties and hence
the construction should be taken most favorable to the defendants if there is doubt in its meaning.
But in answering Appellant's argument we have permitted the application of the first rule of construction to
follow rather than precede. This rule, of course, is the
universally accepted one, that plain language is to be given
its plain and literal meaning.
The words "with 6 rollers and all standard equipment"
6.
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as used in the contract (Ex. P-3) sued upon by plaintiff,
can have only one plain and literal meaning; that is, that
in addition to the standard equipment will be furnished 6
rollers, and of course as pointed out this literal construction of the wording coincides with the contemplation of the
purchase order contract of October 18th.
In its argument that defendants waived installation of
the press under Point No. 3 Appellant says:
"The defendants, after some correspondence with the
agent (dark print added) that had sold the machine,
sent to the plaintiff a letter.
(Ex. P-2).
The significant point there is that not only the Respondents
but the Appellant as well regarded the man Raymond as the
agent of the company, as did the Court at the trial. As
to these Respondents the representation of the agent Raymond (Ex. D-6) was as much a representation of Appellant
as any other correspondence or writing from the company
could have been. The Appellant knew that the Respondents had no knowledge of the machine and would have to
have some tr,aining in the use of the machine, and the position of the Respondents in this regard is that the Appellant
itself induced the execution of the change, modification or
release, by and through its agent Raymond and now seek to
call the release a voluntary release, while as a matter of
fact Appellant's real state of mind was shown by its letter
of April 3, 1952 (Ex. D-7) wherein they say:" - - - - You state that there is no consideration for the
release of Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., from the obligation
to install the equipment. I think the release of Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., is based on the consideration of their
completing the contract of purchase by your client by
the shipment of the equipment and the completion of
the offer to buy submitted by your client in its altered
form. - - - - "
It would seem that the Appellant faces a dilemna, one
7
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horn of which would be if there is a consideration for the
release executed by the Respondents it would necessarily
have to be the promise of their agent, G. H. Raymond, to
install and. give training on the machine, and if they are
not bound through their agent to so install and give training on the machine, then there is no consideration for the
release.
The law applicable to this situation it seems would be found
in 12 Am. Jur. Section 412, Page 990:
"Any new agreement between the parties to an existing executory contract, made in substitution or modification of the elder compact and bilateral in benefit or
burden, has, like the primary contract a sufficient
consideration in the mutual advantages or obligations
which it conferes or imposes. Where an agreement
amounts to a waiver or discharge of mutual stipulations
in a contract either in whole or in part, the discharge
of each by the other from the obligations of the contract may furnish a sufficient consideration. However, there is insufficient consideration in the absence
of such reciprocity. Each party must gain or lose
something by the change. If the benefit or detriment
is unilateral, a consideration is lacking where it is a
widely recognized and well established legal principle
that doing or undertaking to do only that which one is
already under a legal obligation to do by his contract is
no consideration for another's agreement to do what he
is not already under legal obligation to do. Doing or
promising to do that which one is already bound to do
is not a legal detriment. If one party to a contract in
agreeing upon a modification of it either assumes an
additional obligation or renounces any right, promise
of the other is nudum pactum and void. That the
modification is supported by the consideration of the
prior contract has been denied. - - - - "
Cited under this section are cases in support thereof as
follows:
"An executory agreement by the landlord to reduce the
amount of rent which the tenant is bound by the terms
of a written lease to pay, made during the term of the
lease without cancelling it or surrendering the premises, where no change is made in the character of the
8
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tenancy or the state of the premises to the tenant's
disadvantage or the landlord's benefit is a nude pact
without consideration and void. Goldsborough vs.
Gable, 140 Ill. 269, 2 N. E. 722, 15 L.R.A. 294."
Another case cited thereunder is as follows:
"An oral agreement by a landlord in a written lease for
a term of years under seal to accept in the future a reduced rent from the tenant without any other change
whatsoever in the terms of the lease or any corresponding benefit to the landlord or detriment to the
tenant, even when followed by an acceptance of the reduced sum and the giving of receipts therefor, is void
for want of consideration of the payment in whole or
part by the tenant of the rent he had agreed to pay
being insufficient. Coe vs. Hobby, 72 New York 141,
28 Am Rep 120, Durband vs. Nicholson, 205 Iowa 1264,
216 N.W. 278, 219 N.W. 318, citing RCL stating that
there must be a new detriment or benefit."
From this we see that there was absolutely no consideration
for the defendants' release of the obligation of plaintiff to
perform under the contract by installing the machine, unless the man, Raymond, was the agent of plaintiff and in
fact a new promise to install and give training was made
by the plaintiff through its agent Raymond. In either
event of course, plaintiff must fail in this action by reason
of his non-performance of either the original agreement to
furnish a competent man to install, or tq have the man
Raymond install and give training, and the failure to deliver the rollers. The court quite logically took the view
that Raymond was the agent of the appeallant in making
the promises (R 92).
Taking the Appellant's view that several instruments
constitute the ultimate contract between the parties then
the purported release as contained in Appellant's Exhibit
P-2 can be nothing more nor less than a consent to a change
or modification, and this of course is the view that the Appellant took in its letter above cited (Ex. D-7), and hence
9
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even by the authority cited by the Appellant there would
necesarily have to be a consideration for a modification or
·change.
Appellant's argument under Points No. 4 and No. 5 is
somewhat repetitious of previous points, particularly the argument that because the 6 rollers were excluded from the
list of standard equipment that the Appellant was relieved
of the obligation to deliver said 6 rollers. As to the point
that the finding that 6 rollers had not been delivered by
Appellant to the Respondents and that the said machine had
not been installed as being contrary to the evidence, at the
risk of repeating it is pointed out again that the contract
entered into on the 18th day of October, 1951, contained
the provision heretofore mentioned:
"'Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., due to varying and climatic
conditions does not guarantee to supply rollers to meet
local requirements and the rollers supplied are furnished free of charge for the convenience of the erector in
completing installation."
and. seems to conclusively meet the argument of Appellant
that because rollers were not part of the standard equipment they were not to be furnished by the seller. And
while at the trial Appellant made no apparent claim that
rollers were never delivered, every witness testifying on
the subject either denied delivery of any rollers or explained the difference between rollers and roller cores and stated
that what they saw were roller cores (Shonka R-212, Erickson R.-140, Hall R.-211).
As to that part of Point No. 5 claiming that the finding "and said machine was not installed" is contrary to the
evidence, the record is clear that everyone who saw the machine was in agreement that the machine was not installed.
One witness, Charles W. Claybaugh, (R.-181) who testified
he had been in the newspaper and printing business 30
10
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years and who had testified that he had made millions of
impressions upon a similar machine (R.-182), gave answers
concerning an inspection of the machine at the offices of
the Respondents in September, 1952, as follows (R-186):
Did you find at the time you examined this press
that it was installed and ready to print?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you find parts in the back room and a way from
the press?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Parts that would be essential in the printing operation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And were some of these parts still crated?
A. Yes, sir."
Again at Record-185:
"Q. Thank you. These cast rollers, would you state
again what function they perform?
A. They transfer the ink from the ink platen to the
form that is being printed, by rolling over the
form.
Q. Would it be possible to accomplish any printing
without these cast rollers?
A. No, sir." .
And again at Record 188:
Q. Do you know whether or not there were core rollers on the machine at the time you looked at it?
A. I am not positive but I do not believe so.
Q. Do you know whether or not there was an additional set of core rollers in the crate?
A. I am sure of that.
Q. Do you know whether or not there were two sets
of core rollers?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whether or not just one of them was
still crated?
A. I can't remember for sure but I know that the
crate contained the core rollers."
And again at Record-193 on Cross Examination by Mr.
Mann:
"Q. Now, Mr. Call agked you if thiR machine waR installed and ready to print. The machine thn t you
saw, was that installed with exception of the cast
11
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rollers?
No, sir.
Q. What did it lack?
A. It wasn't fastened to the floor in any way, anchored, nor was the electrical equipment attached."
On the same question of installation and delivery of rol·
lers Mr. Edward C. Hall who testified he was President of
the Sun Lithograph Company at Salt Lake City and had
been engaged in the printing and lithography business for
30 years. testified beginning at Record-210:
"Q. Are you acquainted with the Kluge machine?
A. Yes, I have operated them myself.
Q. Would you be acquainted with what is designated
as a 12 x 18 Kluge Platen Press?
A. I would.
Q. And you are familiar with all the various parts
and workings of that machine?
A. lam.
Q. Are you acquainted with the defendants Miss
Erickson and Miss Shonka in this case?
A. I am.
Q. Have you ever been to their business office in Brigham City?
A. Yes, I have, several times.
Q. Did you ever see a 12 x 18 Kluge Press in their offices?
A. I have.
Q. Do you remember when the first time was that you
saw the press there ?
A. No, I don't recall exactly,
Q. Can you give us your best estimate of the time?
A. I would say about a year ago or more.
Q. Did you have occasion to examine the press at that
time?
A. Well, I just examined it. That was all, and noticed that it was a new press.
Q. Do you know whether or not there were any rollers on the press at that time?
A. I don't recall seeing any.
Q. Do you know the difference between a roller and a
roller core ?
A. Yes, I know the difference.
Q. What is the difference?
A.

12
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Well, a core is the inside part of the roller. The
roller is termed as a complete roller ready to put
on the press to distribute ink which is a very essential part of the press as far as the press is concerned.
Q. Is it possible to accomplish any printing with a
roller core?
A. None whatsover.
Q. Is it essential that the roller, that the complete
roller be on the machine ?
A. That is correct."
On Record 213 to the question:
"Q. Based on your own experience in installing these
machines do you have an opinion as to whether or
not the Kluge machine which you saw in the offices of the Acme Multigraph Company was installed?"
,
was made the following answer after some argument by
counsel:
"A. From my observation I would say the press was
not installed. It was just sitting there.
Q. What remained to be done?
A. I would say just a general installation job.
Q. Did you observe whether or not the machine was
bolted to the floor?
A. No, it wasn't sitting in a position where it could
be in proper operating position at the time I saw it.
Q. Did you have occasion to look at it to see whether
or not it was bolted to the floor?
A. Yes, I could see that.
Q. Was it bolted?
A. No, it wasn't.
Q. Do you have an opinion whether or not bolting to
the floor would be necessary for such a machine in
such a location?
(Argument of counsel as to objection.)
A. From my experience I would say the machine
would have to be bolted for an installation of that
kind because of the walk.
Q. What do you mean by the term "walk"?
A. It would move and shift position.
Q. Now, did you see this machine more than once?
A. Yes, I saw it several times at my calls at the
Acme Multigraph Company.
Q. You testified that the first time was approximate13
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ly one year ago and you have seen it since that
time?
A. I would say it has been in the past year, year and
a half.
Q. When was the last time you saw the machine?
A. Late last summer I think it was.
Q. That would be late in the summer of 1952 '?
A. Yes.
Q. At any time you saw the machine did it appear to
be installed?
A. No~ I would say it wasn't. In fact, I know it
wasn't installed because an installation for a piece
of equipment of that caliber should be levelled and
bolted to the floor with the electrical equipment
hooked up and in running condition."
And again upon cross-examination by Mr. Mann (R.-222)
to the question:
"Q. What would this press weigh, do you know?
A. I would say in the neighborhood of 3,000 pounds.
Q. And you would say that would still walk if it were
not bolted down ?
A. Yes, sir. I have owned and opera ted those presses
myself so I happen to know.
Mr. Mann: I believe that is all."
And on redirect examination by Mr. Call:
"Q. Did you install the machine you sold or supervise its installation?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know whether or not the floor over there
is level?
A. No, it isn't absolutely level.
Q. It requires shims?
A. Yes."
The Appellant's own witness, Anthone Petersen, in his
testimony (R.-207) left no doubt as to whether or not the
machine would walk without being bolted when he answered to the question "Will it walk if it is not bolted to the
floor? A. Not if it is level."
From the testimony of the witness, Hall, that the floor
in the offices of the Respondents was unlevel and required
shimming and the incontroverted evidence that such a ma-
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chine would walk, the Court could certainly find that the
machine had not been installed. And again it seems that
the Court could conclude from the contract of October 18,
1951, heretofore quoted concerning the supplying of rollers
for the convenience of the erector and not as items of
standard equipment, that such a machine could not in fact
be properly installed without rollers and a chance to test
the machine. Certainly the Court was entitled. to conclude·
that there had been no installation of this equipment.
Under Point No. 6 Appellant claims that any breach
committed by it was slight and equity should therefore deny
rescision. To this, attention is 0alled to the fact that these
defendants were novices in the printing business, knew
nothing of the machine that they were purchasing, nor
about its operation. Respondents repeatedly corresponded
with Appellant advising it of these facts and demanding
performance of their contract in order that printing could
be accomplished and the machine would not sit in the middle
of their floor in a condition of utter uselessness as to these
Respondents. (Ex. D-13 and D-14). That finally, when
threatened with rescision of the contract. (Ex. D-15) the
agent Raymond did come and uncrate the equipment
(nearly 4 months after the delivery thereof) and assembled
the same, but did not install it, by any stretch of the
imagination and even by his own admission that he would be
back to put on the rollers and give them instruction.
It must be remembered that this was a complicated
3,000 pound printing press, the installation of which, as testified to by the witness Hall and permitted to go in the record by the Court although an objection to the question was
sustained, was that
"The custom and trade for a piece of equipment to bf'
installed would be a professional erector or machinist
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to go out and see that the press is properly installed and
serviced, ready for operatwn. It is turned over and
demonstrated.''
Both the witness Hall and the witness Claybaugh saw the
machine subsequent to the time when Appellant contends
the installation was completed by it.
Under these circumstances it seems unreasonable for
Appellant to complain that the denial by the trial court of its
demand for forfeiture was inequitable.
Further, it cannot be said that the breach is slight or
inconsequential when it goes to the very heart of the thing
contracted for. In purchasing a printing machine these
defendants were contracting for an instrument which would
turn out printing and for the purposes of printing it is
hard to conceive of anything more essential to the operation
than the rolers or the complete installation of such a machine by persons qualified to install it.
12 Am Jurat Page 1022 states:

"----It has been said that if all parts of the contract
are interdependent, so that one part cannot be violated
without violating the whole, a breach by one party of a
material part will discharge the whole at the option of
the other party. Ordinarily however the circumstances attending the breach, the intention with which it
was submitted, and its effect on the other party (dark
print added) and on the general object sought to be accomplished by the contract must be considered in determining whether the breach will operate as a discharge.
If the circumstances are such as manifest an intention
on the part of the party in default to abandon the con·
tract or not to comply with its terms in the future,
or if by reason of the br·each the object sought to be effected is rendered impossible of accomplishment according to the original design of the parties (dark print
added) the breach will operate as a discharge of the
whole contract unless waived."
See also Sorensen vs. LaRue, an Idaho case in 252 Pac.
494 and Shupe vs. Thede, an Iowa case in 218 N.W. 611.
And it may be pointed out that another test applied by
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courts on occasion is the test of substantial performance
which is the test of whether or not the contracting party
has obtained substantially what he bargained for, that is,
has the benefit of the contract been secured by the parties.
To this we state that without installation of the machine
and without delivery of the essential six rollers these defendants have no more received the benefits of the contract
they entered into than if the entire machine had never been
sent. To say otherwise would be like saying that a person
purchasing a new car had received the benefit of his contract by delivery of a car to him without wheels or without
a motor. '".rhe thing for which the contract was made has
never been accomplished until such time as it can be used
for the purpose for which it was purchased, and defendants,
by all the testimony in the record, including the testimony
of plaintiff's erector Anthon Petersen, have never been
able to accomplish even one job of printing.
Further, by its letter of April 3rd (Ex. D-7) Appellant
made it plain that it was not bound and did not intend to be
bound by any provision of any contract requiring it to install the equipment, wherein it is said:
" - -- - I am sorry but Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., state
that they feel that they hav-e completed their full obligation under the contract of purchase with your client
The Acme Multigraph Company, and they advise me
that unless the contract is discharged by Acme Multigraph Company in accordance with the agreement it
will be necessary to proceed against the equipment under the contract.
Very truly yours,
BRANDTJEN & KLUGE, INC.
By /s/ R. D. Meyer
R.D.MEYER"
Certainly, upon rereipt of that letter Respondents were entitled to rescind the contract as they did and demand back
the money spent by them on said contract. And, in res-
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cinding, Respondents offered to surrender the machine to
Appellant.
CONCLUSION
Respondents earnestly contend in the instant caRe that
appellant was obligated to furnish the printing machine,
complete with the essential six rollers, and to install the
same; that neither was done by appellant though repeated
requests were made by respondents, and in fact appeallant
expressed by its correspondence and implied by its acts that
it had no intention of completing its contract and commenced this action for termination and forfeiture without offering or tendering performance; that respondents were entitled to and did properly rescind the contract and tendered
the return of the machine; and that upon the facts, upon the
law, and upon equity, the court was completely justified in
granting judgment to respondents, and his decisoin should
be sustained and respondents given their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
OMER J. CALL
Attorney for Respondents
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